This paper provides an up-to-date analysis of the redistributive eff ects of the Czech tax and benefi t system at the household level. We provide several measures of the extent in which the tax and benefi t system redistributes from the rich to the poor and from the childless households to the households with children. We fi nd a rather weak combined power of the tax and benefi t systems in alleviating income inequalities. The system redistributes primarily towards households with children. While households with children earn 55 per cent of total earnings, they pay 39 per cent of total taxes and receive 68 per cent of total benefi ts. Even the richest households with children contribute a lower share of total net taxes (8 per cent) than their share in total earnings (10 per cent). About a quarter of households with children in the upper income deciles collect some benefi ts while only half of the poorest households without children do.
Introduction
Taxes on earnings constitute a majority of tax revenues in the Czech Republic (CZK 744 billion), and CZK 93 billion is then spent on social benefi ts other than pensions.
1
Understanding the redistributive effects of the tax and benefi t systems and their impact on inequality is crucial for guiding the design of the tax and benefi t systems in the future. Recently, the issues of micro-level impact of tax and benefi t systems and optimal tax design gained renewed interest in the public fi nance literature (see e.g. Mirrlees 2010a (see e.g. Mirrlees , 2010b Paulus et al., 2009; Immervoll, 2004) . This paper contributes to the evidence-based approach to tax policy. Despite many recent reforms, the evidence-based evaluation of tax policies, either ex-ante or ex-post, has been largely missing in the Czech Republic. We explore the redistributive impact of the tax and benefi t systems in the Czech Republic across households by household earnings and the presence of children. We address questions such as: How progressive are the taxes and benefi ts at the household level? How much does the system redistribute from the childless households to the households with children as opposed to redistributing from the rich to the poor? To what extent do households with similar earnings pay similar taxes and receive similar benefi ts? We answer these questions with a newly developed TAXBEN model that uses the Living Conditions survey (SILC), a representative sample of 8,866 Czech households. Several academic papers have explored the distributional measures of the Czech tax-and-benefi t system. Večerník (2006) uses the Czech Microcensus survey in 1988, 1996, and 2002 . He describes the redistribution via the tax-and-benefi t system at household level, focusing on the change in redistribution during years of transition from central planning to market economy. Schneider and Jelínek (2005) investigate the distributive impacts of particular welfare benefi ts and tax allowances and the trends in their relative generosity, using the Household Budget Surveys in 1999 -2002 . Dušek, Kalíšková, and Münich (2013 present the average, marginal, and participation tax rates at the individual level.
Recently, there has been an expansion in the literature providing inter-national comparisons of the redistributive properties of the tax-benefi t systems.
2 Immervoll et al. (2005) explore impact of taxes and benefi ts on income inequalities in the EU-15 countries for 1998 and compare the effectiveness of individual policies at reducing income disparities. There are several recent papers that focus on redistributive effects of tax-and-benefi t policies and their impact on poverty in the EU countries (see e.g. Avram et al., 2012; De Agostini et al., 2014) . Paulus et al. (2009) , a study that is methodologically closest to, examines how taxes and benefi ts shape income distributions in 19 EU countries 3 using the EUROMOD model and policy years 2001, 2003, or 2005 . Our TAXBEN model is tailored for the Czech tax and benefi t system and for the available Czech data. It therefore captures fi ner details of the national system than EUROMOD. 4 It fi ts in the tradition of similar country-specifi c microsimulation models (e.g. NBER's TAXSIM model for the United States - Feenberg and Coutts, 1993 ; the IFS's TAXBEN model for the United Kingdom - Giles and McCrae, 1995) . This paper brings several contributions. First, we provide an up-to-date analysis of the redistributive effects of the Czech tax and benefi t systems. The most recent Czech studies on redistribution (Schneider and Jelínek, 2005; Večerník, 2006) focused on work and other behavioural incentives (Pavel, 2009; Galuščák and Pavel, 2012; Dušek, Kalíšková and Münich, 2013) . We provide an update on the redistributive properties of the tax-and-benefi t system refl ecting the legislation in force in 2013, and some comparisons with other EU countries.
6 Second, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate about tax reliefs and benefi ts supporting the households with children. Using a representative dataset of households we show how the taxes and benefi ts differ across real households with and without children and with varying income levels. We document the extent in which the tax and benefi t system already redistributes towards the families with children and how such support depends on income.
Third, the paper brings some methodological improvements. Our TAXBEN model simulates direct taxes and social benefi ts based on the current legislation and captures some features that are not commonly captured in micro-simulations, such as mortgage deductions, disability tax credits, etc. We also document the dispersion of tax and benefi t rates across households with similar earnings. Our approach follows the standards of the Mirrlees Review.
7 Most importantly, we measure the full tax wedge between the net disposable income and the employer cost or the pre-tax profi t.
Among the key fi ndings, we fi nd that the redistributive effects of the tax and benefi t systems along the income dimension are rather modest. The tax system itself is only slightly progressive. While the tax credits and the benefi t system creates some progressivity in the bottom half of the income distribution, the combined power of the tax and benefi t systems reduces the Gini coeffi cient by 8 percentage points. This is a rather small reduction in international comparison.
On the other hand, the system redistributes primarily from childless households towards households with children. While households with children earn 55 per cent of total earnings, they pay 39 per cent of total taxes and receive 68 per cent of total benefi ts. Even at the top incomes, the redistribution towards the households with children overrides the redistribution from the rich to the poor. The households with children in the 10 th and 9 th income deciles earn 10 and 7 per cent of total earnings but pay only 8 and 5 per cent of total net taxes. About a quarter of households with children in the upper income deciles collect some benefi ts while only half of the poorest households without children collect some benefi ts. The main reason for such redistributive outcomes are generous benefi ts and tax credits that are not means-tested (maternity and parental leave benefi ts and the child tax credit).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main features of the TAXBEN model and the data. Section 3 presents the results. The description of the results is purposefully factual and free of normative recommendations. We reserve some normative assessments for the conclusions in Section 4.
per cent income tax rate replaced a progressive rate structure, and the joint taxation of couples was abolished. A new fl exible system of the parental leave benefi t was introduced and the child allowance benefi t was reformed. In 2011, birth grant became a means-tested benefi t and available for the fi rst child only. In 2012, the parental leave benefi t was made even more fl exible and the social supplement benefi t was abolished. In 2013, a special surcharge on high earners was added.
6
For details on the main parameters of the Czech tax and benefi t system, see the companion paper Dušek, Kalíšková and Münich (2013) .
The TAXBEN Model and Data

Data
We developed a new TAXBEN model that simulates the taxes and benefi ts for individuals and households in the representative "Living Conditions" (SILC) dataset. The SILC is being collected annually by the Czech Statistical Offi ce as a part of the EU-SILC Project. We used the latest available SILC issue (collected in 2011, it provides information on incomes during year 2010) which contains information on 8,866 households consisting of 20,629 individuals. It reports information about the household structure, its dwelling, and the economic activity and health of the household members. Importantly for tax simulations, it reports each member's annual earnings from employment and annual profi ts from small business (self-employment). It further reports the levels of various welfare benefi ts received by the household, the income taxes, social and health contributions (for employees only). SILC is well suited for TAXBEN-type simulations. It is relatively large, representative (including weights allowing to extrapolate to the population), and contains suffi cient amount of income and demographic information to capture the key aspects of the tax and benefi t system. One disadvantage of the SILC is likely under-reporting of capital income -interest, dividends, rents etc. Even though such items exist in the database, their values are frequently zero or unrealistically low. We cannot therefore include taxation of capital income into the analysis but focus solely on earnings from wages or self-employment.
Defi nitions of the main concepts and model simulations
To describe the distributional effects of the tax and benefi t system, we use the concepts of average tax, benefi t, and net tax rates at the household level. These describe the total taxes, benefi ts and net taxes as fractions of the full household earnings. Therefore, these indices can be calculated for households with positive earnings only, and we thus complement them with information on average amounts of taxes, benefi ts, and net taxes paid and received by all households including households without earnings in the analysis below.
The average tax rate is the ratio of total taxes paid by all household members T h (Y h ) to the full household earnings (Y h ):
The average benefi t rate is the share of total benefi ts received by household members
The average net tax rate describes the combined effect of tax-and-benefi t system and is defi ned as total net taxes paid by the household (taxes paid decreased by benefi ts received) over the full household earnings (Y h ):
The full household earnings (Y h ) are defi ned as a sum of earnings from business (gross profi t before taxes and contributions), and work (total employer cost, i.e. the sum of the gross wages and social and health contributions paid by the employer) for all household members. Taxes T h (Y h ) include direct taxes only -personal income tax and mandatory health and social security contributions.
Benefi ts B h (Y h ) include maternity benefi t (peněžitá pomoc v mateřství), birth grant (porodné), child allowance (příspěvky na děti), housing benefi t (příspěvek na bydlení), and aid in material need benefi ts: living allowance (příspěvek na živobytí) and housing supplement (doplatek na bydlení). These benefi ts are simulated in the model, while we also include reported values of benefi ts that cannot be simulated in the model -unemployment benefi ts (podpora v nezaměstnanosti) and parental leave benefi t (rodičovský příspěvek). Simulations of benefi ts that have low take-up rates (housing benefi t and aid in material need) are based on a model that predicts the take-up by each eligible household; the benefi t amounts and benefi t rates reported below already refl ect the predicted take-up and not the mere eligibility for these benefi ts. For details on the tax and benefi t simulations, we refer the reader to a companion paper (Dušek, Kalíšková and Münich, 2013) and an on-line appendix. 8 We normalize earnings, taxes, and benefi ts by the OECD consumption units 9 to refl ect the household size and composition. Households are divided into income deciles based on equivalised gross household earnings (i.e. total gross earningsexcluding employer contributions -of all household members normalized by the OECD consumption units).
10 This approach has one advantage: Households with the same equivalised earnings should have the same living standards irrespective of the specifi c composition of the households (to the extent that the OECD consumption units accurately refl ect the impacts of additional household members on the consumption of individual members). Comparing differences in net taxes across households with different equivalised gross earnings captures redistribution based on pre-tax living standards. Comparing differences within household groups with the same equivalised gross earnings captures additional redistribution based on dimensions other than the pre-tax living standards; specifi cally in this paper, we compare households with and without children. Table 1 shows basic summary statistics separately for households without and with children. We exclude households with at least one inactive pensioner and no potential earner in productive age from the whole analysis. 11 We thus restrict our sample to 5,794 non-pensioner households, which corresponds to over 3 million households in the Czech population (out of 4.38 million total households). 11 We exclude these "pensioner" households from the analysis, because we do not account for old-age pensions in our tax-benefi t system (old-age pensions are not a standard social benefi t, and lack of previous income data in the SILC does not allow us to simulate old-age pensions). Inactive pensioner is defi ned as an individual in the retirement age reporting inactivity, while potential earner is a person aged between 18 and retirement age, who is not a full-time student and does not have serious health problem. Our sample thus excludes all households consisting of inactive pensioners only, but includes multi-generational households, where there are some productive-age individuals living together with their retired parents.
Summary statistics of the sample
12 All the summary statistics reported here and below are based on a sample from the SILC 2011 data, which is reweighted by sampling weights to correspond to actual population size in the Czech Republic.
All incomes, taxes and benefi ts reported here and below correspond to yearly amounts. Households with children are slightly less numerous than households without children. They have higher total gross income than households without children (CZK 474,000 per year compared to CZK 398,000) but lower equivalised income (CZK 179,000 compared to CZK 230,000) because they are larger. Differences in equivalised net income are less pronounced: CZK 157,000 for households with children and CZK 182,000 for households without children which indicates the degree in which the tax and benefi t system redistributes towards households with children. Over half of households with children collect some benefi ts while only 23 per cent of households without children do. Taxes are only slightly progressive for households without children; the average tax rate gradually rises from 35 to 41 percent from the second to the top decile and the fi rst decile actually faces the same average tax rate as the top decile. Taxes are far more progressive for households with children due to child tax credits. The size of the child tax credit does not vary with income 13 and can have the form of a negative income tax. Therefore they represent a far larger percentage reduction in the tax paid for the low-income households. Figure 1 plots the household average tax rates and their distribution against equivalised gross household earnings. This fi gure conveys similar information as Table 2 , but also demonstrates the dispersion in the tax rates across households. The "bandwidth" between the highest and lowest average tax rate for the same level of earnings is around 20 percentage points at most levels of equivalised earnings. This is driven mainly by differences in taxation of employees and self-employed, and by the presence of generous tax credits for households with children and only one earner (for details, see the companion paper Dušek, Kalíšková and Münich, 2013) . The dashed and solid lines depict the population means for the households without and with children, respectively. They clearly depicts the differences in taxes between households with and without children at lower income deciles. The average benefi t rate at the lowest levels of earnings varies greatly and exceeds 1 for some taxpayers, but then falls rapidly to 3 per cent once equivalised earnings exceeds CZK 150,000 and then converges to almost zero (see Figure 2) . The disparities in benefi ts are substantial. In the fi rst two deciles, there are households whose benefi ts exceed their earnings as well as households who receive no benefi ts. The solid line illustrates that the low-income households with children collect much higher benefi ts than childless households with similar incomes. Even in the upper part of income distribution (7 th to 9 th income decile), the average benefi t rate is about 2 per cent for households with children but zero for households without children.
Results
Average rates of taxes, benefi ts and net taxes
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Figure 2 | Distribution of Household Average Benefi t Rates
Note: Only non-pensioner households with positive earnings are shown.
Source: SILC 2011, TAXBEN model based on 2013 legislation Figure 3 and the rightmost panel of Table 2 depict the joint distributional effect of the combined tax-and-benefi t system. The differences in net tax rates between the households with and without children are most pronounced at the lowest income deciles. Only households in the fi rst decile receive more in benefi ts than they pay in taxes. Those without children face a net tax rate of minus 39 per cent compared to minus 182 per cent 14 This is again due to the entitlement to parental allowance and maternity leave benefi ts, which are the both very important in magnitude and are not means tested. for households with children. 15 This net tax rate gap gradually narrows to 2 percentage points in the 5 th and higher deciles, as the net tax rates converge to 41 per cent for households without children and 39 per cent for households with children. Both taxes and benefi ts contribute to this gap between households without and with children; however, benefi ts are quantitatively more important.
As Figure 3 illustrates, the combined tax and benefi t system is progressive up to equivalised income of CZK 400,000 and it is approximately proportional at higher incomes. It is visibly more progressive for households with children. The disparities in net tax rates are more pronounced than the underlying disparities in the tax and benefi t rates, particularly at low earnings. There are households with the same equivalised earnings facing net tax rates as high as 40 per cent as well as households receiving equally large net subsidies. At higher earnings levels, there is still a fairly wide "bandwidth" of approximately 20 percentage points. 15 The very high negative net average tax rates in the fi rst decile are crucially driven by very low denominator (average annual gross earnings in the fi rst decile is CZK 7,600 per unit), rather than very high benefi ts. The fi nal columns of Table 2 show how the taxes and benefi ts translate into the equivalised net incomes. In every decile, the net incomes of households with children are greater than net incomes of childless households with the same gross equivalised income. In the poorest decile, the tax and benefi t system elevates the equivalised incomes of households with children to twice the amount of households without children (CZK 47,100 and 24,700, respectively). In the 2 nd through 4 th deciles, the net equivalised incomes of households with children are substantially greater than the net incomes of childless households with the same gross income; the difference becomes much less signifi cant in higher deciles. A different perspective on the disparities in taxes and benefi ts is given by Table 3 . It shows the fraction of households that receive positive benefi ts or pay positive net taxes, and the average amounts for those with positive values. 16 One half of households with children receive some benefi ts, while only one fi fth of childless households do. Among childless households, only 52 per cent of households in the fi rst decile and 40 per cent in the second decile collect benefi ts.
Identifying benefi t recipients and net taxpayers
On the other hand, 99 per cent of households with children in the fi rst decile and 87 per cent in the second decile collect some benefi ts. Even in the upper deciles, the share of households with children who collect some benefi ts is between 22 to 28 per cent. The parental allowance and maternity benefi ts are the culprits -they are not conditional on income, and the amounts of these benefi ts are quite high compared to other benefi ts. 17 For that reason, the benefi t recipients with children in the top three deciles actually collect higher absolute amounts of benefi ts (per unit) than recipients in all other deciles except the fi rst.
The last panel of Table 3 shows that 89 per cent of households without children and 86 per cent of households with children are net taxpayers. Only 19 and 10 per cent of households in the 1 st decile are net taxpayers. This share jumps sharply in the 2 nd decile for households without children (89 per cent of net taxpayers) and much less so for households with children (61 per cent of net taxpayers). From the 5 th decile up, essentially all households pay more in taxes than they receive in benefi ts. Table 4 provides perhaps the clearest gauge of the distributional effects of the tax-and-benefi t system at the household level. It reports the share of each income decile in total earnings, and the corresponding shares in taxes, benefi ts, and net taxes. If the shares in net taxes were the same as the shares in earnings across all deciles, the tax and benefi t system would be strictly proportional. If a particular household group has a lower share in net taxes than in earnings, the tax and benefi t system redistributes relatively towards that group.
Progressivity of the tax and benefi t system
Households with children earn 55 per cent of total earnings, pay 39 per cent of total taxes, receive 68 per cent of total benefi ts, and as a result, pay 36 per cent of net taxes. The share in net taxes for households with children is 2 or 3 percentage points lower than their share in earnings across the whole income distribution. Strikingly, even the households with children in the 10 th and 9 th deciles have lower share in net taxes than in earnings. Thus at the top incomes, the redistribution towards the households with children overrides the redistribution from the rich to the poor such that the richest households with children contribute less than proportionately to earnings.
The households that are predominantly taxed are the rich households without children. Their top deciles makes 14 per cent of total earnings but pays 23 per cent of total net taxes. Childless households in the 6 th to 9 th deciles also have higher share in net taxes than in earnings, by 1 to 5 percentage points. On the other hand, the poor childless households in the 2 nd through 5 th deciles have exactly the same shares in net taxes as in earnings. The tax and benefi t system thus does not redistribute (in relative terms) to these households. Only the childless households in the poorest decile are the net benefi ciaries in both relative and absolute terms.
Table 4 also shows that 30 per cent of all benefi ts are paid to the poorest decile, while the second decile gets 17 per cent. Interestingly, each decile above the median collects To illustrate the extent to which the tax and benefi t systems reduce income inequality among households, we report Gini coeffi cients of household incomes before and after taxes and benefi ts in Table 5 . When considering all households together, the Gini coeffi cient for the equivalised gross household earnings is 0.397. In international comparison, this is a very low level of inequality. In comparison with 19 EU countries 18 from the Paulus et al. (2009) study, the Czech Republic would have the second lowest income inequality before taxes and benefi ts (after the Netherlands). When taxes and benefi ts are added, the Gini coeffi cient of net earnings decreases to 0.332. Therefore, the interplay of the Czech tax and benefi t systems decreases inequality by mere 7 percentage points, when measured by Gini coeffi cient. However, this is rather low decline in international comparisonmost tax-benefi t systems decrease inequality measured by the Gini coeffi cient by around 10-15 percentage points, similarly low redistribution can be found only in the Southern European countries (Paulus et al., 2009: Figure 4, p. 11). 19 18 The sample includes the EU-15, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia.
19 However, Paulus et al. (2009) include also public pensions into the benefi t system, while we exclude retiree households from the analysis entirely. The last two rows of Table 5 decompose the Gini coeffi cients by households without and with children. The equivalised gross earnings are distributed more equally among households with children; their Gini coeffi cient is 0.367 as opposed to 0.404 for households without children. The tax and benefi t system reduces inequality far more among the households with children. Their Gini coeffi cient decreases by 8 percentage points while it decreases by only 4 percentage points for the childless households.
Benefi ts and net taxes by the number of children
Given the important differences in redistribution between households with and without children, we further investigate how the number of children affect the taxes paid and benefi ts received (Table 6 ). The tax rates decrease while the share of benefi t recipients and the benefi t rates increase substantially with the number of children in a household. This is a consequence of the linkage of the child tax credit and the child allowance to the number of children in a family. Benefi ts constitute on average only 10 per cent of household earnings for households with 1 or 2 children as opposed to 34 per cent for households with three and more children. On the other hand, households with three and more children have lowest per unit earnings, are most likely to be eligible for some benefi ts (73 per cent collect at least one benefi t), and face, on average, negative net taxes.
Assessment and Conclusions
This paper documents the redistributive impact of the current Czech tax-and-benefi t system along two dimensions: household earnings and the presence of children. The combined tax-and-benefi t system is progressive, but is much more progressive among households with children. It decreases income inequality measured by Gini coeffi cient by 8 percentage points among households with children and by 4 percentage points among childless households. These are rather small declines in international comparison.
Most importantly, the Czech tax-and-benefi t system primarily redistributes towards families with children rather than families that are poor. Households with children earn 55 per cent of total earnings, pay 39 per cent of total taxes, receive 68 per cent of total benefi ts, and as a result, pay 36 per cent of net taxes. Childless households only receive benefi ts if they have very low or no income (aid in material need) or low income and high housing costs (housing benefi t).
Concentrating the tax reliefs and benefi ts on families with children leads, however, to some unintended distributional consequences. Among others, households with above-median earnings collect full 23 per cent of all benefi ts. The households with children in the 10 th and 9 th deciles represent 10 and 7 per cent of earnings but they pay only 8 and 5 per cent of total net taxes. While the tax and benefi t system does redistribute from the rich to the poor, it redistributes towards the families with children so much more such that the rich families with children end up contributing to the system less than proportionately to their earnings. The benefi t recipients in the top three deciles of income distribution actually collect higher absolute amounts of benefi ts (per unit) than recipients in all other deciles except the fi rst. On the other hand, the poor childless households in the 2 nd through 5 th deciles have exactly the same shares in net taxes as in earnings. Only the childless households in the poorest decile are the net benefi ciaries in both relative and absolute terms. Supporting families with children is a widely shared policy objective in the Czech Republic. Almost each new government has pursued this objective by proposing further extensions of child-related tax reliefs or benefi ts, not taking into account that the support is already high. Such proposals should fi rst be based on the understanding of how generous these policies are already and what their effects are. We show that the existing tax-and-benefi t system is already extraordinary generous to families with children. This fi nding is further supported by international comparisons: according to an OECD study, the net tax rate faced by a stylized Czech household with two children is 30 percentage points lower than the net tax rate faced by a single worker, which is the highest gap among the OECD countries. 20 The richest households with children contribute, relative to their earnings, less than poor households without children. Such a redistributive outcome is diffi cult to justify even under a strong preference for redistribution towards children. Based on our fi ndings, the natural alternative to the current state would be to curtail the child-related tax reliefs and benefi ts for the richest households and start better targeting the truly poor households, with or without children.
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